CUF-Moscou, 2 février-10 février 2017
Cours 1. Une philosophie imaginaire : critique et spéculative
Cours 2. Le syndrome du thermomètre
Sur la conférence de Lacan au colloque de Batimore, 1966: “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever”
Comment définir le rapport de Lacan aux mathématiques, ou le rapport du « structuralisme » de Lacan à un « structuralisme » mathématique ?
Le texte marque un moment clé dans le parcours de Lacan où, à la fois, Lacan sépare son modèle du sujet de celui qui ressortirait des mathématiques et de la science modernes, et utilise de façon systématique des objets mathématiques pour fixer ce modèle du sujet.
Il s’agit en particulier de situer Lacan par rapport à Cavaillès (et à Bateson) qui utilisent également les mathématiques (et parfois les mêmes éléments mathématiques) pour mettre en question l’étendue de la conscience.
Exposé au colloque “Batimore 1966”, Université Paris 10, décembre 2016
Revenir sur la portée philosophique que je donnais à la fiction (Mon zombie et moi, 2010) au regard de la distinction entre corrélationisme et spéculation qu’établit Q. Meillassoux (Après la finitude, 2006)
Exposé au colloque Le réalisme aujourd’hui,Paris 10, novembre 2016
In his novel Vendredi ou Les limbes du Pacifique, Michel Tournier opposes the time of the Earth which can be measured, numbered and which accumulates, and the time of the Sun, which does not pass in the same way. The time of the Earth, as Tournier describes it, is the kind of time, which, in Max Weber’s essay, The Spirit of Capitalism and Protestant Ethic, it is a sin to waste, a view that Weber considers as being at the origin of capitalism. But there would different ways to describe both the time of the Earth and the time of the Sun. After all, time was first measured with the help of a sundial.
In the same way, in La poétique de la rêverie, Gaston Bachelard refers to water, as an “element”, to describe the “dreamer’s cogito”, a state of being that, precisely, is not a cogito in Descartes’ sense and in which there is no time. But water, the river in which we only bath once, can also be the image of time. In his book L’eau et les rêves, Bachelard himself investigates this image and this view of water.
These examples raise several questions. Why do we refer to elements, water, earth, fire or, at least, the Sun, when we want to describe these unusual times, times that would not pass as the time of the clock? Why do these elements support such various views of time? To try and answer these questions, I will discuss Bachelard’s analysis of “elements”, and the role they may be given in an imaginary metaphysics.
Communication at the SLSA Conference, Atlanta, November 2016th
Exposé au colloque “La réception de Wittgenstein en France”,
Université Paris 10, septembre 2016
Entretien avec Géraldine Mosna-Savoye, autour de la métaphysique d’un bord de mer, pour Les nouveaux chemins de la connaissance, France Culture, 1er juillet 2016.
Ecouter ici :
Discussion autour de l’homme invisible, le 17 mai 2019
Rencontre autour de la paresse, le 19 mai 2016
Entretien avec Monique Atlan
à propos de mon livre
Métaphysique d’un bord de mer
Visible sur http://www.france2.fr/emissions/dans-quelle-eta-gere
ISEA 2016 (Keynote), May 21st, 2016, Hong-Kong
Kafka’s short story, « In the Penal Colony », is centered on a complicate and rather mysterious machine. The inspector, and the reader, will never completely understand its function. But we know that it writes, it engraves the sentence on the body of the man convicted in characters that are in themselves undecipherable. The convict does not know his sentence until after it has been carved on his body, at the very end in fact, just before he dies.
The machines of neuroscience are complicate and mysterious to us. Some of them are meant to spy our thoughts in our brains, or report our lies or recognize and read our biases (are we aggressive, psychopaths, racists, pedophiles?). We may not be conscious of these biases but the machine would spot them nevertheless. It seems that we have written on our body (in our brain in fact) in characters that we cannot read ourselves something fundamental about our person. Is it similar to chiromancy? For the believer, the lines of our hands meant something which was decisive for our future but which only an expert could read. Of course, chiromancy was a children tale, whereas neuroscience is science. Another difference may be that we have lines in our hands whether we try to read them or not. What about the neuro-traces of our biases? These strangely shaped red zones that appear on the colorful map of the criminal brain, did they exist before the machine was set into action? Or did the machine somehow impose them in the brain of the subject? Do we live in a penal (neuro)-colony?
It is the question,I will investigate using several art works referring to the brain: a machine for reading thoughts that the Belgian writer Jean-Philippe Toussaint put up at the Louvre in 2012, several pieces from Gregory Chantonsky, and a recent film by Gwenola Wagon and Stephane Degoutin.
At stake is the relationship between the subject and a new form of power conferred to technology. There is embodied in the machines of neuroscience a new kind of biopolitics that does not concern life in general but the specific existence of brain. To what extent does the subject of the (neural)-penal colony remain human? Or has become (s)he a telepathic rat? How could (s)he escape? Do these works, writings, installation, films, concerning neuroscience enable us to confront the neuro-power or do they contribute to fascinate us and re-establish the (neural)-penal colony
Correlationism and postmodern stories
Loloya Marimount University, Los Angeles, April 8th 2016
This paper discusses Q. Meillassoux’ arguments in Après la finitude in relation to fiction. My main example is the story that Lyotard tells at the beginning of his article “Une fable postmoderne”. This story produces “ancestral statements” but these appear in a story rather than in science, whereas Meillassoux only refers to “ancestral statements”, coming from, or apparently coming from science. To what extent can fiction make ancestral statements? What is the speculative value of ancestral statements in fiction?
I make two claims.
First, I argue that the importance that Meillassoux gives to science in his book comes from the fact that he considers all science to be reducible to one theory referring unequivocally to a single universe, which is doubtful with regards to contemporary science.
Second, I argue that Meillassoux ‘s criticism of correlationism and his own attempt to get out of correlationism depend on what I call the “principle of the present” according to which only the present can be immediately given, or in Meillassoux’ words “the given is contemporaneous to the givenness”. That is, I can not have an immediate access to, have an intuition of, be given, the past nor the future, but only the present. This principle occurs in two keys arguments in Meillassoux’ book. Bergson’s theory of memory would seem to support the view that this principle of the present is false. Moreover, if one can consider fiction as a kind of givenness, a form of intuition as it were, then it clearly does not verify the principle of the present, since I can tell now a story about the past or the future. Thus I conclude that fiction considered as a form of intuition may produce ancestral statements while remaining in a correlationist background. In fact, if one refuses the principle of the present, the alternative between correlationism and speculation that Meillassoux puts in place falls: one can speculate, make ancestral statements, while still being a correlationist.